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The Economics of Middle East Military Expenditures: 
Implications for Arms Reduction in the Region* 
Robert E. Looney** 
Naval Postgraduate School 
1. Introduction 
Over the decade prior to the Iraqi invasion 
of Kuwait, there had been a marked slow-
down in defense spending in many countries 
in the Middle East. Contractions in the 
share of national resources allocated to the 
military came as growing fiscal problems 
prompted governments to reorder their 
spending priorities. This reduction had been 
less prevalent in countries such as Egypt and 
Israel. Still apparently the region as a whole 
has been examining the potential costs and 
benefits of allocations to the military. 
Conventional wisdom has long argued 
that heavy outlays on defense divert scarce 
resources from directly productive invest-
ment and human capital formation (educa- · 
tion, health). 1 While this view makes 
intuitive sense, there is evidence that mili-
tary expenditures do not necessarily reduce 
economic growth in developing countries as 
a whole. Defense expenditures may act as 
an economic stimulus through the creation 
of demand for a variety of heavy-industry 
products. Presumably, without defense, 
many of these plants would not be capable 
of operating at or near full capacity. There is 
also the acquisition of advanced technolo-
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gies that may ultimately provide employ-
ment and attract further investment.2 
In view of the likely acceleration in 
defense expenditure following the recent 
round of hostilities in the Gulf, this study 
examines the relationship between defense 
spending and economic performance in four 
of the major countries in the region - Egypt, 
Syria, Israel, Saudi Arabia. On the basis of 
this assessment, several implications follow 
concerning future spending patterns. A final 
section speculates about the economically 
sustainable military expenditure limits for 
each country. 
2. Country Trends 
Several distinctive military expenditure pat-
terns have developed in recent years. 3 
2.1 Saudi Arabia 
Beginning from a somewhat low base, Saudi 
Arabia experienced a steady acceleration in 
defense expenditures between 1960 and 
1973, with defense increasing its share of 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) from 3.7 to 
11.9%. Defense's share of non-oil GDP and 
public allocations also rose during this per-
iod, from 9.2 to 42.5% and 38.1 to 65.9%, 
respectively. 
F()llowing the oil price increases of 1973-
74, defense rapidly increased its share of 
non-oil GDP to 67.2% in 1975 and acceler-
ated its share of total GDP to 21.0% by 
1979. Other government expenditures also 
expanded rapidly after 1973, so that the 
share of total government expenditures allo-
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cated to defense fell from 65.9% in 1973 to 
42.3% in 1979. 
After peaking in real terms in 1982, 
defense expenditures have contracted each 
year through 1988, with defense maintaining 
its share of total GDP at 22%. At the same 
time, defense stabilized its share of total 
government expenditure in the low forties. 
Growth in non-oil GDP has caused the 
military's share of this aggregate to fall from 
47.6% in 1982 to 27.8% in 1988. 
2.2 Egypt 
Prior to 1966, Egyptian defense expendi-
tures grew steadily, with the defense share 
of GDP rising from 5.81 in 1959 to a yearly 
average of 7 to 8%. Real growth was posi-
tive each year, often reaching double digits, 
with a high of 25.91 in 1954 and a low of 
3.33% in 1966. 
The 1967 war resulted in a sudden rapid 
expansion that extended through 1974. This 
period was characterized by very rapid 
increases in defense allocations, often in-
creasiQg by over 30% per annum. Defense 
increased its share of GDP from 10.88 in 
1967 to 36.51 % in 1973. 
The rest of the 1970s were characterized 
by generally high negative rates of real 
growth in defense expenditures. The net 
result was that by 1980 defense expenditures 
had fallen to 7.3% of GDP. 
The 1980s (at least until the final few 
years) were again a period of expansion, 
with defense expenditures increasing from 
7.3% of the government's budget to nearly 
20% by 1987. Rapid economic growth, how-
ever, maintained the share of resources 
devoted to defense at around 7%. 
2.3 Syria 
From the late 1950s up to the time of the 
1977 war, Syria experienced irregular 
growth in defense. At this time, defense 
expenditures expanded at rates averaging 
less than that of real GDP. The net result 
was a fall in the country's defense burden 
from 9.5% of GDP in 1958 to 7.5% in 1967. 
Between the 1967 war and 1980, defense 
expenditures increased rapidly, from 7.5% 
of GDP in 1976 to 22.8% in 1980. This 
pattern made Syria one of the most heavily 
armed of the Arab states. 
Since 1980, defense expenditures have 
contracted every year except 1982, so that 
by 1987 the defense burden had returned to 
approximately its 1958 level (around 9.5% 
of GDP). The sharp contraction in the 
defense burden has not translated into a 
similar decline in the government budgets. 
In 1980, for example, defense comprised 
around 36% of the central government's 
expenditures, while by 1987 the military's 
share had increased to 40.4%. 
2.4 Israel 
The actual figures for Israel's defense 
expenditures are controversial and subject 
to a wide range of error. Our data show that 
the country's allocations to the military have 
gone through several distinct phases. 
From 1950 to the mid-1960s, real defense 
expenditures increased rapidly, particularly 
after 1954. The net result, despite rapid 
economic growth, was a slight increase in 
defense as a share of GDP from 6.4%' in 
1950 to 8.1% in 1965. 
Between 1966 and 1977 (exception 1972), 
rapid mobilization resulted in the military's 
share of GDP increasing to 28.2%. Since 
1977, the country has experienced a steady 
decline in defense expenditures, with six 
years of negative growth rates in real allo-
cations to the military. By 1987, the defense 
burden had returned to approximately its 
1965 level of 8.5% of GDP. A correspond-
ing decline occurred in the government's 
budget, where defense declined from 
around 55% of the budget in 1.974 to a little 
over 26% in 1987. 
3. Economic and Development Impact 
The patterns noted above provide insight 
into the manner in which the sample coun-
tries differ among themselves and from the 
rest of the world in their patterns of military 
expenditures, socio-economic development, 
and general pattern of public expenditures. 
Clearly, there are several similarities 
between the four countries in our sample. 
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These include generally high levels of mili-
tary expenditures and somewhat large 
amounts of non-defense expenditures per 
capita. On the other hand, several signifi-
cant differences exist, particularly regarding 
levels of and movements in socio-economic 
performance. 
Surprisingly, the received literature does 
not provide a definitive answer as to the 
possible economic consequences of another 
period of stepped-up military expenditures 
in the region. Much of this literature is 
anecdotal and biased toward the standard 
'guns versus butter' analogies. Since the 
modern defense establishment is a heavy 
consumer of technical and managerial labor 
and foreign exchange - resources that are 
especially scarce in the Third World - the 
conventional argument is that increased 
defense burdens should reduce the general 
rate of growth. 4 
In the original empirical examination of 
these issues, Benoit found strong evidence 
to suggest that defense spending encouraged 
the growth of civilian output per capita. 5 On 
the other hand, Rothschild concluded that 
increased military expenditures lowered 
economic growth by reducing exports in 
fourteen OECD countries during 1956-69.6 
In an examination of 54 developing coun-
tries for the sample period 1965-73, Lim 
found defense spending to be detrimental to 
economic growth. 7 Deger & Sen, Leontief 
& Duchin, Faini, Annez & Taylor, Biswas 
& Ram, and Grobar & Porter also found 
evidence refuting the claim that defense 
spending stimulates economic growth.8 
Research examining the economic impact 
of Third World military expenditure using 
various sub-groupings of countries has, 
however, tended to contradict these find-
ings. 9 Much of this research implicitly 
argues that in certain economic situations it 
is possible that, by creating a stable envir-
onment, added defense expenditures may 
stimulate higher rates of investment, tech-
nological progress, technology transfer, and 
therefore increased growth. 
More specifically, it appears that certain 
groups of Third World countries - usually 
the more successful economically, the more 
stable politically, or those engaged in mili-
tary production - derive positive effects 
from military spending. Those countries, 
less successful economically, more politi-
cally unstable, or lacking a domestic arms 
industry, fail to derive any positive econ-
omic impacts from defense expenditures. 
Having said this, it is important to note 
that several adverse effects do stem from 
defense expenditures. This is true even in 
those countries experiencing higher rates of 
growth from increased allocations to 
defense. In particular, countries with an 
indigenous arms industry may suffer a deter-
ioration in the distribution of income from 
added defense expenditures. The same pat-
tern may also occur in military regimes as 
the authorities shift income from urban 
consumers to industrial groups. 10 
A major limitation of the studies cited 
above is that cross-sectional studies are, by 
their nature, very aggregated. The result is 
that extending their findings to specific 
countries is hazardous at best. One excep-
tion is Lebovic & Ishaq's study of defense 
spending in the Middle East. 11 Using a 
pooled time-series, cross-sectional analysis 
,on various groupings of Middle East states, 
they found that higher military spending 
tended to suppress economic growth in the 
non-oil states of the Middle East during the 
1973-84 period. 
Yet, while Lebovic & Ishaq drew on time-
series data, they could not incorporate the 
potential effects of lags between the time 
when defense expenditures occur and the 
period of maximum economic impact. In 
this regard, Babin has noted that incorpor-
ating the time variable into analysis can be 
critical because some relationships that may 
exist over time disappear in the short run 
and vice versa. 12 Clearly, at the national 
level, development usually requires a series 
of chi\nges that occur through systems which 
involve organizations, agencies, economic 
structures, and technological change. Con-
sequently, it is unjustifiable to assume that a 
country's defense spending will have an 
immediate (or even short-term) effect on 
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national economic performance. Babin's 
main finding was that while short-run econ-
omic effects of defense expenditure may be 
nil or even negative, the longer-term effect 
on growth is likely to be positive. 
Similarly, Kick & Sharda's analysis indi-
cated that an increase in the military man-
power ratio does have a significant positive 
effect on two indicators of development, 
infrastructure and social welfare. 13 This 
impact occurs with a long (12-year) lag. 
Kick & Sharda also found that the relation-
ship over a 12-year period is positive. 
Militarization, whether measured by ex-
penditures or size of the military, does 
contribute to development, they found. 
The statistical tests adopted to assess the 
economic effects associated with increased 
defense expenditures in the sample coun-
tries were designed to overcome some of the 
problems noted above. 14 In particular, (1) 
tests were undertaken to identify the direc-
tion of causation - did defense expenditures 
impact on the economy or were they instead 
simply det@rmined by changes in the under-
lying economic environment? (2) lags were 
explicitly introduced to determine the time 
phasing of the defense/economic inter-
actions; and (3) comparisons between 
defense and other types of government 
expenditure were made in order to deter-
mine whether defense expenditures in-
creased (or decreased) economic aggregates 
over and above that associated with alterna-
tive forms of government spending. Several 
interesting patterns appear to be at work. 15 
3.1 Saudi Arabia 
While defense expenditures have in a 
general sense mirrored developments in the 
oil sector, the impact on the economy is 
complex and has altered over time: 
(1) For the period as a whole, defense 
and non-oil economic activity were closely 
interrelated. Movements in defense tended 
to reduce somewhat increases in real non-oil 
output with a four-year lag. Increases in 
non-oil GDP tended to stimulate additional 
increases in defense expenditures. 
(2) The relationship between defense 
expenditures and real non-oil GDP appears 
to have changed over time. From the begin-
ning of the period under consideration to 
the time of the deterioration in oil markets 
(1982), it appears that defense was largely 
affected by non-oil GDP (and not vice 
versa). This was also the case for govern-
ment consumption (a large component of 
defense expenditures). Investment and 
private consumption tended to affect non-
oil GDP with short lags. 
(3) Over the past 18 years, a clear pattern 
has emerged whereby defense expenditures 
have become intertwined with non-oil GDP. 
Within this new relationship, defense 
expenditures increased non-oil GDP with an 
average lag of two years. In turn, increases 
in non-oil GDP have been translated, with a 
one-year lag, into expanded allocations for 
defense.. · 
(4) Also during this period, the relation-
ship between non-oil GDP and government 
consumption seems to have changed, so that 
causation began to run largely from GDP to 
government consumption. One implication 
of this pattern is that defense expenditures 
have taken on a stronger role relative to 
government consumption in stimulating 
non-oil income. 
These findings suggest that, at least on the 
aggregate level, the Saudi Arabian economy 
has not suffered from the large defense 
burden assumed by the government. The 
same appears true regarding government 
allocations to socio-economic development. 
Specifically: over the 1979-88 period: 
(1) Defense expenditures appear to be 
complementary with increased allocations 
to human resource development and health. 
(2) The major negative budgetary trade-
offs involving defense were concentrated in 
the economic areas: (a) transportation and 
communications; (b) economic resource 
development; and, to a lesser extent, (c) 
infrastructure. Defense expenditures also 
tended to come at the expense of several 
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administrative allocations, including pay-
ments to municipalities, and subsidies for 
government lending institutions. 
(3) Areas such as general administration 
and the direct government subsidies program 
for agriculture did not suffer a reduction 
in their relative share of the government 
budget from high levels of military expen-
ditures. 
3.2 Egypt 
The somewhat irregular pattern of Egyptian 
defense expenditures has resulted in a cor-
responding differential impact on the 
country's leading economic aggregates: 
(1) For the 1965-87 period as a whole, no 
statistical pattern occurs between the 
growth of the defense burden and GDP. 
During an earlier sub-period, 1965-80, 
defense expenditures had a negative impact 
on real GDP. However, a second sub-
period, 1970-87, was characterized by little 
or no interrelation between defense and the 
economy. 
(2) The impact Qf government consump-
tion expenditures in the two sub-periods was 
somewhat different from that of defense: for 
the 1965 period, government consumption· 
was interrelated with GDP, tending as with 
defense to reduce GDP with a one-year lag; 
for the 1970 to 1987 period, it was deter-
mined by GDP. From this we can conclude 
that defense allocations have been deter-
mined in large part by factors independent 
of changes in the country's resource base. In 
contrast, other (non-defense) categories of 
government expenditure appear to mirror 
closely developments in the economy. 
(3) Both defense and general govern-
ment consumption expenditures are import 
intensive, with increases in each leading to a 
follow-on expansion in imports. Still, there 
is one major difference between the two 
types of expenditures: in the 1970-87 per-
iod, increased imports also facilitated 
increases in government consumption (but 
not in defense expenditures). Again, this 
finding shows the relative reliance of 
government consumption on the country's 
underlying resource base. 
(4) The major difference between 
defense expenditures and general govern-
ment current expenditure lies in their 
respective effects on real gross capital for-
mation. Increases in the defense burden 
have a strong positive impact on investment. 
This impact is spread out over a four-year 
period - not only for the period as a whole, 
but for each sub-period as well. In contrast, 
changes in government consumption had a 
negative (with a one-year lag) effect on 
gross capital formation. 
(5) Government expenditures affected 
private consumption, while defense had lit-
tle relationship to this measure. As with 
gross capital formation, increases in govern-
ment consumption reduced, after a one-year 
lag, the rate of expansion in private con-
sumption. This 'crowding-out' occurred in 
each sub-period, and for the period as a 
whole. 
From these patterns, we can note that 
defense expenditures in Egypt have several 
positive linkages with the economy as a 
whole. In particular, expanded defense 
expenditures appear to increase the profit-
ability of investment. The net result was 
probably higher rates of investment than 
would have otherwise been the case. 
On the other hand, the strong import 
effect associated with defense expenditures 
may at times have compounded the 
country's foreign exchange problems, thus 
causing a general contraction of the econ-
omy. This phenomenon appears to have 
been present before 1980, but was not a 
factor in the preceding years, perhaps 
because of United States military aid. These 
results also suggest a 'Military Keynesian-
ism' effect emanating from the positive 
impact of defense procurement on the local 
economy. 
In this regard, military Keynesianism 
stresses the demand generating aspect of 
defense expenditures. In this way, military 
spending may have significant multiplier 
effects on the local economy, particularly if 
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concentrated on the acquisition of domestic 
equipment and supplies. 
It is also possible, with excess industrial 
capacity, that positive industrial linkages to 
the non-military private sector exist. It 
follows that the demand generation emanat-
ing from the military may, through 
increased capacity utilization, expand out-
put and increase the rate of return on 
capital, investment, and possibly growth. 
The possibility of positive military Keynes-
ian effects associated with counter-cyclical 
government procurement may in part 
account for the positive net impact of 
defense expenditures on growth in Egypt. In 
Israel, as noted below, defense expenditures 
have been particularly effective in stimulat-
ing increases in capital formation. 
In contrast to their possible military 
Keynesianism effects, defense expenditures 
have come at the expense of several types of 
socio-economic budgetary allocations: 
(1) During normal (non-surge) periods, 
increases in defense came at the expense of 
administration, health (particularly clinics), 
economic services (particularly communica-
tions) and, to a lesser extent, intere.st pay-
ments on the government debt. 
(2) During periods of stepped up defense 
expenditures, cuts are also felt by housing 
and community activities, energy, transport-
ation and communications and, to a lesser 
extent, roads. 
(3) During normal periods, defense allo-
cations increase allocations to transport-
ation and communication, roads, water, 
housing, social security and welfare and, to 
a much lesser extent, education. 
These patterns suggest that mild cuts 
occur over many budgetary categories 
during periods of moderate expansion in 
defense expenditures. However, during pe1-
iods of rapid military buildup, several econ-
omic programs bear the full brunt of 
government cutbacks. These compositional 
effects may go a long way in explaining why 
defense expenditures had a negative impact 
on growth in the years preceding the 1980s, 
but not afterwards. 
3.3 Syria 
Over the last several decades Syria's econ-
omic growth has stemmed from increased 
government expenditures, including mili-
tary expenditures, together with rapid 
increases in investment. Still, the impact of 
government expenditures has varied over 
time: 
(1) For the period as a whole, increases 
in the defense burden had a strong effect on 
GDP. This impact was spread over time, 
averaging four years. In turn, increases in 
GDP provided a short-run (one-year) stimu-
lus to the defense budget. 
(2) For the initial period (1962:....80), cau-
sation was largely from increases in GDP to 
defense, with defense having little impact on 
the expansion of GDP. 
(3) The 1967-87 period mirrored the first 
sub-period, with defense greatly facilitating 
economic growth, and in turn receiving a 
portion of the augmented resources gener-
ated through the growth process. 
(4) These patterns did not simply reflect 
the general increase in government expen-
ditures. While government expenditures 
produced a feedback relationship with GDP 
for the period as a whole, their relationship 
to GDP during both sub-periods was con-
siderably different from that associated with 
defense expenditures: in the first sub-period 
(1962-80), government consumption in-
creased growth and in turn expanded with 
the economy. In the second sub-period, 
government consumption was a major 
source of growth. However, during this 
period a feedback mechanism from govern-
ment consumption to GDP was not a signifi-
cant factor in affecting the expansion of the 
economy. 
From these findings we may conclude that 
in Syria defense expenditures have appar-
ently aided the country's economic expan-
sion, particularly in more recent times. 
There is also evidence that the government 
gives higher priority to these expenditures 
than it does to other types of public sector 
allocations - they are the first to expand 
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during periods of additional resource avail-
ability, and perhaps the last to be cut during 
periods of austerity. 
Several additional defence/economic rela-
tionships amplify this conclusion: 
(1) A strong set of interrelationships 
occurs between defense and imports, with 
defense contributing to the country's import 
burden. In turn, additional imports are used 
in part to expand the country's expenditures 
on defense. 
(2) The same pattern was found between 
defense and gross fixed capital formation 
and private consumption (with private con-
sumption probably mirroring movements in 
GDP). 
(3) Other than revenue availability, the 
one constraint on Syrian defense expendi-
tures is official concern over inflationary 
pressures - increased inflation often reduces 
expansion in resources earmarked for the 
military. Despite somewhat high levels of 
defense expenditures, allocations to the 
military do not appear to have come at the 
cost of socio-economic improvement. 
(4) Over the 1974-86 period, Syria exper-
ienced a steady improvement in socio-
economic conditions. This occurred during a 
period in which, for the most part, the· 
country was becoming more militarized, 
while simultaneously experiencing declines 
in public non-defense expenditures per 
capita. 
3.4 Israel 
Israel's economic problems cannot be attri-
buted solely to its level of military expendi-
tures: 
(1) For the period as a whole (1955-87) 
there is a strong positive relationship from 
GDP to increased defense expenditures 
(with a constant-price Shekel increase of 
GDP equalling one, resulting in a 0.14 
constant-price Shekel increase in defense 
expenditures). 
(2) While this relationship held for the 
20-year period, 1955-75, it appears to have 
broken down in recent years; during the 
1967-87 period, there was no statistically 
significant relationship between the growth 
in defense expenditures and that of the 
economy. 
(3) On the other hand, increases in 
defense expenditure have, with a one-year 
lag, stimulated increased rates of invest-
ment. While defense expenditures and 
general government consumption showed 
no relationship to imports over the 1955-75 
period, increases in defense expenditures 
caused increases in imports over the 1967-
87 period. During this time, increases in 
imports permitted government consumption 
to expand. 
These import patterns suggest that the 
impact of defense expenditures on the econ-
omy is fundamentally different from that of 
other types of government allocation. In 
addition, this differentiation is increasing 
with time. In recent years, defense expen-
ditures have been given high priority, with 
non-defense expenditures allowed to expand 
only when excess resources are available, 
often stemming from United States aid. 
Perhaps because of US aid, the impacts 
of defense expenditures on socio-economic 
allocations are also less severe than might be 
expected: 
(1) Few if any of the major budgetary 
categories have been systematically reduced 
by either increases in the share of defense 
in the budget, or shorter-term surges in 
defense expenditures. 
(2) On the other hand, the government 
has apparently viewed general public 
services, social security and welfare, and 
interest payments as complementary with 
defense. 
4. Implications 
External debt has been used to support 
military spending in several of the sample 
countries. In large part, these funds have 
helped to neutralize many adverse effects 
associated with defense spending. The 
inability of countries such as Algeria, Egypt, 
and Syria to increase their external borrow-
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ing will mean an increased likelihood of 
defense expenditures having a negative 
effect on their economies. 
It is also likely that key rivalries in the 
region will continue to stimulate defense 
spending in the 1990s. This may result in 
deteriorating economic performance in the 
respondent countries, particularly if they 
are simultaneously confronted with foreign 
exchange scarcity. 
Interestingly enough, defense expendi-
tures have not had the adverse effects often 
ascribed to them, except in situations where 
arms races or warfare have accelerated mili-
tary spending to levels that the domestic 
economy could not efficiently absorb. This 
suggests that a threshold exists beyond 
which defense expenditure becomes detri-
mental to economic performance. 16 Such 
thresholds would, of course, vary by country 
and over time, but barring sudden and 
dramatic political or economic change they 
can be forecast at least for the short term. 
Drawing on an analysis of short- and long-
term impacts of defense expenditures, we 
shall now forecast defense expenditure 
thresholds and future military expenditure 
patterns for the individual coun'tries. 
4.1 Saudi Arabia 
Because of the recent hostilities in the Gulf 
and increasing worries about internal secur-
ity, defense spending is likely to continue to 
have high priority in Saudi Arabia and will 
increase over the next several years. Such a 
trend could over time have negative conse-
quences for the Saudi Arabian economy, 
which appears to be close to its military 
expenditure threshold. 
Defense expenditures in Saudi Arabia 
cease to have a positive impact on the non-
oil economy when they grow at a rate of 
over 25% per annum and/or average over 
44% of non-oil GDP for a decade or more. 
In the decade 1978-88, defense expendi-
tures comprised 44% of non-oil GDP. How-
ever, during the decade from 1977 to 1987, 
Saudi Arabian defense expenditures de-
clined at an average rate of 3.7% per 
annum. 
With the prospect of higher oil revenues 
for at least several years, together with the 
lower than average rates of increase in 
defense expenditures, especially in the past 
five years, the Kingdom should be able to 
expand its defense expenditures without 
appreciable negative effects on the domestic 
economy. 
One possible factor limiting the potential 
positive impact of defense expenditures on 
the Saudi economy stems from the slow-
down in government investment in infra-
structure in recent years. If the resulting 
infrastructure deficiencies limit the expan-
sion of the non-oil economy, defense expen-
ditures may cease to provide a positive net 
stimulus to the economy. 
4.2 Egypt 
Egyptian allocations to defense will have a 
neg~tive impact on the economy if they 
grow at rates (1977-87 = -7.5%) over 9% 
per annum for an extended period. The 
current Gulf crisis will result in a consider-
able expansion in Egyptian defense expe.n-
ditures. However, given below-average 
rates of expansion in military expenditures 
during the past decade, the economy should 
receive a slight stimulus from these allo-
cations. Historically, defense expenditures 
have had a positive impact on the economy 
when they average rates of growth of less 
than 6.0% per annum. 
On the other hand, the Gulf crisis is likely 
to cost the country upwards of USO 2 billion 
a year in lost remittances. If the United 
States were to forgive the Egyptian military 
debt and/or waive servicing of the debt, the 
balance-of-payments effect of this expan-
sion would not put a severe strain on the 
country's foreign exchange reserves. 
Most of the stimulus to the economy will 
come from an expansion in the country's 
arms industries. Given the likely can-
cellation of Egyptian military debt by 
the United States, the country can move 
toward the more technical end of the spec-
trum of production through the acquisition 
of foreign designs, parts and production 
technology. 
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4.3 Syria 
The recent Iraqi aggression is likely to cause 
repercussions in Syria, as it will throughout 
the Middle East. Syria will undoubtedly be 
forced to increase its military spending as 
the Gulf region becomes more unstable and 
Israel continues to arm. 
In this regard, Syrian defense expendi-
tures will cease to produce a positive stimu-
lus to the economy if they grow at over 14% 
per annum (1977-87 = -2.0%) for a 
decade. While the country's debt-service 
problems have become more severe in 
recent years, higher oil prices should relieve 
some pressure. This effect may be tempered 
somewhat because the country was aided in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s by several 
large military grants, which are unlikely to 
be matched in the future. While no negative 
impacts from defense are likely, given the 
already precarious state of the Syrian econ-
omy, a sudden surge in defense spending 
may not produce many positive benefits. 
In contrast, a moderate step-up in Syrian 
military spending brought on by the Gulf 
crisis should not place severe strains on the 
economy. These expenditures might even 
provide a mild stimulus to growth. 
4.4 Israel 
In the face of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, 
Israel will almost certainly increase its 
defense spending over the next several 
years. 
There is no real evidence that Israeli 
defense expenditures have either diverted 
resources away from capital formation or 
reduced other major sources of growth, as 
long as growth in defense spending has been 
confined to under 18% per annum over a 
decade. The negative 4.3% per annum con-
traction in defense expenditures over the 
past 10 years should leave considerable 
scope for a military buildup without adverse 
effects on the economy. 
This assessment must be qualified, how-
ever, because United States grants have 
helped neutralize any latent negative effects 
that might have been otherwise associated 
with Israel's heavy defense burden. Given 
current US budgetary conservatism and 
improving oil markets (and the consequent 
ability of countries like Iraq to finance 
expanded military expenditures), Israel's 
defense burden may begin to contribute to 
the country's economic deterioration before 
growth rates in the 18% range are reached. 
5. Conclusions 
For the most part, cross-sectional studies 
have implicitly assumed that a 'guns versus 
butter' situation exists in developing coun-
tries whereby increased defense expendi-
tures come at the expense of investment 
and, ultimately, of real economic growth. 
The four country case-studies examined 
above provide evidence somewhat at odds 
with this view, however. Looked at in a 
dynamic context, defense expenditures are 
not necessarily at odds with acceptable 
economic performance. In fact defense 
expenditures appear to have provided a 
greater stimulus to investment than that 
offered by other types of government 
expenditures. Regarding shorter-run bud-
getary trade-offs, there do not appear to be 
any strongly negative associations between 
defense and growth-enhancing expenditures 
such as economic services or education.17 
Ultimately, however, the generally positive 
impact of defense on investment must 
account for the counter-intuitive finding that 
defense and growth are positively linked. 
In this regard, the findings are consistent 
with the cross-section studies noted above: 
the impact of defense expenditures seems to 
vary over time, depending on the relative 
degree of resource constraint. For the most 
part, defense expenditures provide a posi-
tive stimulus to the economy. However, 
when defense expenditures outrun the econ-
omic resource base, they are either neutral 
or negative in their impact. 
Although there is little evidence support-
ing•the alternative position that investment 
or growth causes defense, many countries 
have developed fairly elaborate feedback 
mechanisms whereby defense impacts on 
investment and growth and in turn is affec-
ted by that growth. While there is little 
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evidence that defense hurts investment or 
growth, there is ample support for the 
position that: (a) the relationship between 
defense and investment or growth varies 
considerably among countries, and (b) the 
lag structures also differ greatly. 
The paradox of defense expenditures is 
that a possible expansion in regional mili-
tary expenditures following the Gulf conflict 
is unlikely to produce the disastrous econ-
omic effects assumed by many commen-
tators. It does not follow, however, that 
little concern should be given to the longer-
run impacts associated with defense expen-
ditures. Before any final conclusions can be 
drawn concerning the economic conse-
quences of regional defense expenditures, 
we need more information concerning the 
precise manner in which defense allocations 
affect growth. Are these largely through 
Keynesian (demand) linkages? or invest-
ment (supply) effects? Why is investment 
stimulated by defense? Is this stimulus due 
to the link between indigenous defense 
industries-; or does defense buy stability and 
therefore an improved investment climate? 
In large part, defense expenditures have 
stimulated regional economic activity rela-
tive to that provided by non-defense allo-
cations. In a way this is very unfortunate. As 
Janice Stein has observed, a much higher 
priority should be given in the future to 
crisis prevention in the region. 18 Unfortun-
ately the threat of poor economic perfor-
mance stemming from stepped-up defense 
expenditures does not appear to be a factor 
restraining rearmament. Clearly one pro-
ductive area for crisis prevention would be 
to aid these countries in identifying the 
means through which they could obtain a 
stronger economic stimulus from non-
defense expenditures. 
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